Source: J. Noakes & G. Pridham, Documents on Nazism 1919-1945 ,(London, 1974), pp.401-403
Germany's economic situation:
Just as the political movement among our people knows only one goal, the preservation of our existence, that it is to say, the securing of all the spiritual and other prerequisites of the self-assertion of our nation, so neither has the economy any other goal than this. The nation does not does not live for the economy, for economic leaders and theories; on the contrary, it is finance and the economy, economic leaders and theories, which all owe unqualified service in this struggle for the self-assertion of our nation. Germany's economic situation is, however, in the briefest outline as follows: We are overpopulated and cannot feed ourselves from our own resources. When our nation has six or seven million unemployed, the food situation improves because these people lack purchasing power. It naturally makes a difference whether six million people have 40 marks a month to spend, or 100 marks. It should not be overlooked that a third of all who earn their living is involved, that is to say that, taken as a proportion of the total population, through the National Socialist economic policy about 28 million people have been afforded an increase in their standard of living of, an average, from at least 50 marks a month to at most 100-200 marks. This means an increased and understandable run on the foodstuff market. But if this rise in employment fails to take place, the effect of under nourishment will be that a higher percentage of the population must gradually be deducted from the body of our nation so far as its effective contribution is concerned. Thus, despite the difficult food situation, the most important task of our economic policy is to see to it that all Germans are incorporated into the economic process, and so the prerequisites for normal consumption are created. In so far as this consumption concerns articles of general use, it can be satisfied to a large extent by an increase in production. In so far as this consumption falls upon the foodstuff market, it cannot be satisfied from the domestic German economy. For, although the output of numerous products can be increased without difficulty, the yield of our agricultural production can undergo no further substantial increase. It is equally impossible for us at present to manufacture artificially certain raw materials, which we lack in Germany or to find other substitutes for them. There is. However, no point in endless repetition of the fact that we lack food stuff and raw materials; what matter is the taking of those measures which can bring about a final solution for the future and a temporary easing of conditions during the transitional period. The final solution lies in extending our living space, that is to say, extending the sources of raw materials and foodstuff of our people. It is the task of the political leadership one day to solve this problem. The temporary easing of conditions can be achieved only within the framework of our present economy. In this connection, the following must be noted: Since the German people will be increasingly dependent on imports for their food and must similarly, whatever happens, import proportion at least of certain raw materials from abroad, every effort must be made to facilitate these imports. An increase in our own exports is possible in theory but in practice hardly likely. Germany does not export to a political or economic vacuum, but to areas where competition is very intense. Compared with the general international economic depression, our exports have fallen, not only not more, but in fact less than those of other nations and states. But since import of food on the whole cannot be substantially reduced and are more likely to increase, an adjustment must be found in some other way. It is, however, impossible to use foreign exchange allocated for the purchase of raw materials to import foodstuff without inflicting a heavy and perhaps even fatal blow on the rest. But above all it is absolutely impossible to do this at the expanse of national rearmament. I must at this point sharply reject the view that by restricting national rearmament, that is to say, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, we could bring about an "enrichment" in raw materials which might then benefit Germany in the event of war. Such a view is based on the complete misconception, to put it mildly, of the tasks and military requirements that lie before us. For even a successful saving of raw materials by reducing, for instance, the production of munitions would merely mean that we should stockpile these raw materials in time of peace so as to manufacture them only in the event of war, that is to say, we should be depriving ourselves during the most critical months of munitions in exchange for raw copper, lead, or possibly iron. But in that case it would none the less be better for the nation to enter the war without a single kilogram of copper in stock but with full munitions depots rather than with empty munitions depots but so-called "enriched" stocks of raw material. War makes possible the mobilisation of even the last remaining supplies of metal. For it then becomes not an economic problem, but solely a question of will. And the National Socialist leadership of the country will have not only the will but also the resolution and the toughness necessary to solve these problems in the event of war. But it is much more important to prepare for war in time of peace. Moreover, in this respect the following must be stated: There can be no building up of a reserve of raw material for the event of war, just as there can be no building up of foreign exchange reserves. The attempt is sometimes made today so to represent matters as if Germany went to war in 1914 with well-prepared stocks of raw material. That is a lie. No country can assemble in advance the quantities of raw materials necessary for war lasting longer than, say, one year. But if any nation were really in a position to assemble those quantities of raw material needed for a year, then its political, military and economic leaders would deserve to be hanged. For they would in fact be setting a side the available copper and iron in preparation for the conduct of a war instead of manufacturing shells. But Germany went into the world war without any reserves whatsoever. What was available at that time in Germany in the way of apparent peacetime reserves was available counterbalanced and rendered valueless stocks of ammunition. Moreover, the quantities of raw materials that are needed for a war are so large that there has never in the history of the world been a real stockpiling for a period of any length…
